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0. Introduction 
 
In the opening paragraphs of his now classic paper “Leibniz and 
the Foundations of Physics: The Middle Years,” Daniel Garber suggests 
that Leibniz must seem something of a paradox to contemporary readers 
(1985, 27). On the one hand, Leibniz is commonly held to have advanced a 
broadly idealist metaphysics according to which the world is ultimately 
grounded in mind-like monads whose properties are exhausted by their 
perceptions and appetites. On such a picture, physical bodies would seem 
to be nothing more than the perceptions or thoughts (or contents thereof) 
enjoyed by immaterial substances.1 On the other hand, it is generally 
recognized (if perhaps less clearly) that Leibniz was also a prominent 
physicist in his own day and that he saw his work in physics as supporting, 
and being supported by, his metaphysics.2 But how, in light of his idealism, 
could that be? How could Leibniz think that his pioneering work in physics 
might lend support to his idealist metaphysics, and conversely that his 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Earlier versions of this essay were presented to audiences at the 
Westfälische Wilhelms-Universität Münster, Yale University, Brown 
University, and Dartmouth College. I am grateful to participants at those 
events as well as to referees of this journal for their comments on earlier 
drafts. I owe special thanks as well to Donald Rutherford and Samuel Levey 
for helpful discussion of the material presented here. 
1 For an entry point into idealist interpretations of Leibniz’s metaphysics, 
see Adams (1994) and Rutherford (1995).   
2 For an entry point into Leibniz’s physics, see Garber (1995), Hecht (1992), 
and McDonough (2014).  
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idealist metaphysics might provide an especially intelligible foundation for 
his sophisticated physics? 
A familiar story suggests that Leibniz effectively develops two 
separate systems, bridged by divine benevolence.3 On this account, physics 
is a science of appearances, metaphysics a science of reality, and God’s 
goodness assures us that our investigations of the former will somehow 
provide insight into the latter. Resisting this traditional story as a complete 
account, Garber boldly proposed that for much of his career Leibniz could 
see a more intimate connection between his physics and his metaphysics. 
Garber argued that during his “middle years” Leibniz subscribed not to a 
broadly idealist metaphysics of unextended, immaterial substances, but 
rather to a realist metaphysics of extended, corporeal substances. During 
that period, he claimed, Leibniz could take the objects of his physics to be 
literally constituted by the objects of his fundamental metaphysics, much as 
we commonly take, say, the objects of biology to be constituted by the 
objects of chemistry. On Garber’s interpretation, Leibniz, for at least much 
of his career, could see his studies in physics as being continuous with his 
studies in metaphysics just as we are inclined to see biology as being 
continuous with chemistry. Garber suggested that, at least during his middle 
years, Leibniz appears first and foremost as a natural philosopher, a 
systematic thinker who takes for granted an intimate connection between 
his physics and his metaphysics precisely because he recognizes no 
principled distinction between his work qua physicist and his work qua 
metaphysician. 
Garber’s groundbreaking proposal for understanding Leibniz’s 
attitude toward the foundations of physics quickly sparked controversy 
concerning Leibniz’s commitment to corporeal substances.4 In the intense 
debate that ensued, however, Garber’s original paradox, as well as the 
obvious limitation of his solution to it, largely fell out of focus. Although 
Leibniz’s views on corporeal substances remain controversial, almost all 
commentators, including Garber, agree that at some point Leibniz’s 
metaphysics turns recognizably monadic (see Garber 1985, 99; 2009, 303-
388). And after that point – whenever that point might be – Garber’s 
original paradox must reemerge in full force. For as soon as the deepest 
foundations of Leibniz’s metaphysics are exhausted not by extended, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 For sophisticated developments of this story, see Adams (1994, 217-399), 
Gueroult (1967, 210-214), and Rutherford (1995, 177-288).  
4 For a helpful overview of the debate and further references, see Levey 
(2011).  
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material substances, but rather unextended, immaterial monads, it becomes 
unclear, once again, how he could see his pioneering physics as lending 
support to his idealist metaphysics and his idealist metaphysics as providing 
an especially intelligible foundation for his sophisticated physics. In short, 
even if corporeal substances can help us make sense of Leibniz’s attitude 
towards the foundations of physics in his “middle years,” we still face the 
challenge of making sense of his attitude towards the foundations of 
physics in what we might correlatively call his “later years.”  
The following essay takes up that challenge by offering an account 
of the relationship between extended Leibnizian bodies and unextended 
Leibnizian monads, an account that shows why Leibniz was right to see 
intimate, explanatory connections between his studies in physics and his 
mature metaphysics. The first section sets the stage by introducing an 
especially relevant case study from Leibniz’s technical work in natural 
philosophy, namely, his historically important, but almost wholly neglected, 
investigation of the strength of extended, rigid beams. The second section 
draws on that case study to introduce a model for understanding Leibniz’s 
views on the relationship between the derivative and primitive forces. The 
third section draws on Leibniz’s understanding of the relationship between 
derivative and primitive forces in order to shed light in turn on his 
understanding of the relationship between the extended, material bodies 
and unextended, immaterial monads. The fourth section responds to a 
likely objection by arguing that Leibniz’s monads may, in a perfectly 
reasonable sense, be spatially located.    
 
1. Leibniz on Rigid Beams 
 
Galileo initiated the mathematical study of elasticity in general, and 
the strength of rigid bodies in particular, with the second day of his Two 
New Sciences (1890-1910, 8:151-190/1974, 109-146). There Galileo 
introduces the following problem: if a prismatic beam is set into a wall at 
one end, and loaded with a weight at the other end, how much weight is 
needed in order to break the beam?  Making reference to Figure 1, Galileo 
suggests that the beam should be thought of as a two-armed lever with a 
fulcrum at B (1890-1910, 8:156/1974, 115). The beam can then be thought 
of as being attached to the wall along the arm BA, and the weight E can be 
thought of as applying a downward force on the arm BC.  
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Figure 1  
 
Galileo’s calculation of how much weight the beam can support is 
presented as a ratio comparing the amount of force it would take to break 
the beam by pulling directly on it along the horizontal direction and the 
amount of force it would take to break the beam by applying a downward 
force at the end of the beam. Letting Pt = the force required to break the 
beam by direct pulling (where “t” stands for “tension”) and Pb = the force 
required to break the beam by applying a force at point C, Galileo argues 
that Pb = ½ Pt.5   
Leibniz begins his discussion in his Demonstrationes Novae (1684) by 
acknowledging a debt to Galileo, who, as he puts it, “equipped with a 
discerning judgment and a strong grasp of the geometry of interiors, first … 
began to relate the resistance of solids to geometrical laws” (1684, 319). 
Nonetheless, Leibniz notes that experimental results, especially those 
conducted by Marriotte, with whom Leibniz was in direct correspondence, 
suggest “a much lesser weight F is sufficient to break the beam than Galileo 
wanted.” The root of Galileo’s error, Leibniz argues, is that “he considered 
a perfectly rigid beam, which would be broken off at a single instant once 
its resistance has become excessive” (1684, 321). Leibniz maintains, on the 
contrary, however, that all beams “yield to some extent before they can be 
torn off … [as] can be seen by the example of a staff which twists before it 
shatters, and the example of strings, which stretch out before they break” 
(1684, 321). Taking into account variations in resistance over the cross-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 For discussion of Galileo’s treatment of rigid beams, see Truesdell (1957, 
34-44) and Benvenuto (1991, 176-197).  
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sections of a beam as well as over its length, Leibniz arrives at an improved 
formula for a cubic beam, namely, Pb = ⅓Pt.6  
In order to arrive at this result, and to take into account the 
flexibility of weighted beams, Leibniz imagines a representative beam as 
first being composed along the horizontal dimension by long “fibers” 
running from end to end, and, second, by vertical “slices” or “elements.” In 
this way, the beam is to be imagined as a series of discrete blocks that are 
strung-through by horizontal fibers so that each fiber runs through every 
element and each element contains a cross section of all the horizontal 
fibers, as in Figure 2 (not due to Leibniz):  
 
Figure 2 
It is worth noting that Leibniz’s division of the beam into fibers and 
elements is in a way arbitrary and in a way not arbitrary. As is well known, 
Leibniz believes that all gross bodies are actually, infinitely divided. His 
division of the beam into threads and elements, however, is not meant to 
correspond directly to the divisions that he thinks must actually be present 
in the beam. The highly idealized division of the beam in to threads and 
elements is thus, in one way, clearly and intentionally arbitrary. As Mark 
Wilson has recently emphasized, however, we all know from everyday 
experience that weighted beams distort primarily along two dimensions, the 
vertical and the horizontal.  Leibniz’s idealized division of the beam cleverly 
exploits this experiential knowledge by bringing to the fore the two 
dimensions that will require the closest scrutiny if a workable equation for 
rigid beams is to be produced. It is thus, in another way, anything but 
arbitrary (Wilson 2010, 2).  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 For discussion of Leibniz’s treatment of rigid beams, see Truesdell (1957, 
59-64), Hecht (1992, 100-112) and Wilson (2010). 
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Having divided the beam into idealized fibers and elements, 
Leibniz next imagines that the fibers act like springs holding the elements 
together so that the beam may be thought of as a series of rigid blocks 
connected by springs strung between the connecting surfaces.  Figure 3 
represents one such block ABKC, which itself functions as a two-armed 
lever with a fulcrum at A connected to the neighboring surface DE by 
springs such as 1B2B and 1H2H, and weighted at C along the arm AC.   
 
Figure 3  
Attention to Figure 3 highlights in an especially clear way that Leibniz’s 
division of the beam into threads and elements is not just idealized but – by 
his own lights – patently artificial. For, first of all, each element is conceived 
as a perfectly inflexible, rigid block. But, as we’ve just seen, Leibniz thinks 
that there are no perfectly inflexible, rigid blocks, and, indeed, he thinks that 
recognition of this very fact is crucial for arriving at the correct laws 
governing the very phenomena under consideration. The idea that beams 
might be constituted by rigid blocks such as ABKC is thus patently artificial 
both by the lights of Leibniz’s general natural philosophy as well as by the 
specific principles guiding his attack on the very problem of rigid beams. 
Second, each thread binding one element to another element is conceived 
as a flexible spring, that is, as a flexible, but resisting body. But, of course, it 
is precisely the phenomena of flexible, resisting bodies that is under 
investigation in the case of rigid beams. Leibniz couldn’t possibly think that 
the literal postulation of little springs could explain the resistance of rigid 
beams – such a suggestion could only push the explanatory problem back a 
step since we would then need an account of the resistance of the little 
springs. Leibniz’s use of tiny springs is thus, once again, I think, best 
understood not so much an idealization – that is, as an intentional 
exaggeration of the actual properties of the beam – but rather as a 
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fictionalization, an attempt to make the problem of finding the laws 
governing rigid beams more tractable by thinking of them in patently 
artificial terms. 
And remarkably, Leibniz’s fictionalized model does indeed make 
the original problem of finding an equation governing rigid beams more 
tractable by showing how beams may be treated as instances of optimal 
form. In the simplest of terms, an optimal form is a form or structure that 
(locally) minimizes or maximizes some quantity. Perhaps the most familiar 
case in which Leibniz applies the notion of an optimal form is in optics, 
where he argues that rays of light travel along easiest paths, where “ease” is 
a quantity that can be calculated from the distance the ray travels and the 
kinds of mediums it traverses.7 To see how rigid beams may be thought of 
as instances of optimal form, it may be helpful to begin by imagining a 
beam divided into five elements and arranged in two different 
configurations as in Figures 4 and 5:  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 For an introductory discussions of optimal form see Hildebrant and 
Tromba (1985) and Lemons (1997). For discussion of Leibniz’s optics in 
connection with optimal form, see McDonough (2010; forthcoming-a).  
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Figure 4 
 
 
       
 
  Figure 5 
Left to their own devices, weighted beams generally assume configurations 
that minimize their overall stress energy as in Figure 4. That they should do 
so is presumably a contingent fact, but one so intuitive as to seem almost 
self-evident. It’s hard to even imagine how a truly uniform beam might 
come to assume a configuration such as that represented in Figure 5. 
Confronted by such a configuration we naturally assume that the beam is 
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not really uniform after all, or that there must be some cause external to the 
system that is responsible for the beam assuming a configuration that does 
not minimize stress energy.  
Although Figure 4 represents an optimal configuration of a beam 
divided into five rigid sections, a moment’s reflection will suggest that we 
can improve upon even its configuration by dividing the beam into more 
elements, as in Figure 6:  
 
 
Figure 6 
The beam in Figure 6 stores less stress energy than the beam in Figure 4 for 
essentially the same reason that the beam in Figure 4 stores less stress 
energy than the beam in Figure 5. And, indeed, it is characteristic of 
Leibniz’s thinking about special problems in mechanics to suppose that the 
truths of mechanics should not be dependent upon scale – just as we find 
non-optimality unacceptable in the large, so we should find it unacceptable 
in the small. But once we recognize that the beam can more closely 
approach an optimal form as it is divided into smaller elements, it should be 
clear that the best configuration of the beam – best in the sense of best 
minimizing its stress energy – will never be obtained as long as the beam is 
divided into a finite number of elements, each having some finite length. 
The optimal configuration of the beam will occur in the limit as the number 
of elements goes to infinity and length of each element approaches zero. 
An optimally configured beam will thus be a continuous beam in which 
stored energy is distributed continuously.   
In the continuous case, however, something almost miraculous 
happens: the two patently artificial assumptions made by Leibniz, having 
served their purpose, disappear. The postulation of rigid elements and 
elastic springs allows Leibniz to skirt a problem ultimately rooted in the fact 
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that the cohesive forces holding elements together are of a different 
dimensional order than are the gravitational forces drawing the elements 
downward. The cohesive forces, in short, act on two-dimensional surfaces, 
while gravitational forces act on points. With the beam conceived of as rigid 
elements and elastic springs, Leibniz can, as we’ve seen, treat the problem 
of determining the resistance of beams as a constrained equilibrium 
problem and effectively work around the dimensional problem. In the limit 
however, the dimensional difference between surface and gravitational 
forces vanishes just as we lose our grip on how we might think of the beam 
as being composed of extended blocks and extended springs. That is to say, 
in the continuous case, the dimensional problem and the patently artificial 
postulates used to work around it disappear together, and we may think of 
the beam as possessing a continuous distribution of resistive forces acting at 
points. We have the remarkable, but not uncommon, situation in which the 
observable properties of gross bodies are successfully related to 
unobservable point properties via the mediation of patently artificial models.  
The observable properties provide us with our only grip on the values of 
the point properties, and yet the point properties provide us with our best 
means of thinking about the properties of apparently continuous, uniform 
bodies.8   
Does Leibniz’s analysis of the strength of rigid beams provide us 
with a new, unexpected argument for monads? Not directly. What it shows 
most directly is one useful way of relating the observable forces governing 
extended bodies to the point forces that are revealed by application of the 
infinitesimal calculus as the lengths of beam segments are pushed to zero. 
Perhaps almost as directly, it also offers an intriguing prima facie reason for 
thinking that those point forces have some sort of privilege over the 
observable forces governing a beam. For all that, however, one could still 
view Leibniz’s analysis instrumentally. That is, one might hold that thinking 
in terms of point forces is a helpful way of arriving at good equations, but a 
way that needn’t commit us to the existence of anything unextended. The 
most immediate value of Leibniz’s analysis of rigid beams is thus not to be 
found in a new, direct argument for monads, but rather in its offering an 
exceptionally elegant model of how extended bodies and their forces might 
relate to unextended monads and their forces. The next two sections will 
attempt to develop that model, first with respect to Leibniz’s understanding 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 For a more detailed discussion – from which I have benefited – of the 
points made in this paragraph, see Wilson (2010). See also Batterman (2001).  
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of derivative and primitive forces, second with respect to extended bodies 
and unextended monads.  
 
2. A Model for Leibnizian Forces  
 
Leibniz’s mature dynamics is structured principally by two 
orthogonally drawn distinctions. The first distinction separates “active” 
from “passive” forces. Intuitively, active forces correspond to a creature’s 
intrinsic ability to bring about change. Leibniz distinguishes between two 
kinds of active force. The first is what Leibniz terms “living force” or “vis 
viva.” A body’s living force corresponds to its ability to bring about change 
in virtue of its motion. A fast-moving baseball, for example, will have more 
living force than a slow-moving baseball (all other things being equal of 
course). The second is what Leibniz terms “dead force” or “vis mortua.” A 
body’s dead force is perhaps best thought of as a tendency, or striving, to 
produce vis viva. Thus Leibniz tells us, for example, that although “motion 
does not yet exist in” dead force, dead force is nonetheless “a solicitation to 
motion, as with a … stone in a sling while it is still being held by a rope … 
and [is] also the force of heaviness … and the force by which a stretched 
elastic body begins to restore itself” (GM 6:238-9/AG 121-122). While the 
details of the integration may have remained unsettled, it’s clear that Leibniz 
thinks of dead forces as being quantitatively related to living forces by an 
infinite summation.   
The second principal distinction of Leibniz’s mature dynamics 
separates primitive forces from derivative forces. If we restrict ourselves – 
as Leibniz himself usually does – to active forces, we can say that primitive 
forces correspond to the internal strivings of immaterial substances (G 
4:395/AG 252). Thus, in a well-known letter of 1704 or 1705, Leibniz tells 
De Volder, “I think that it is clear that primitive forces can be nothing 
other than the internal strivings of simple substances, by which they pass 
from perception to perception in accordance with a certain law of their 
nature” (G 2:275/LDV 318). Active primitive forces are thus the forces 
internal to monads that drive them from one perceptual state to the next.  
As their name suggests, Leibniz conceives of derivative forces as 
being in some sense dependent upon, or derived from, primitive forces. His 
use of the term “derivative force,” is, however, ambiguous. In one sense, 
“derivative force” connotes the instantaneous states of enduring primitive 
forces. Thus in another letter to De Volder of January 21, 1704, Leibniz 
writes: “Derivative force is the present state itself insofar as it tends toward 
a following state, i.e., preinvolves a following state, just as everything in the 
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present is pregnant with the future.  But the persisting thing itself, insofar as 
it involves all cases, has primitive force, so that primitive force is like the 
law of the series, and derivative force is like a determination that designates 
some term in the series” (G 2:262/LDV 286). Here the term “derivative 
force” is used to draw a contrast at the deepest level of reality, a contrast 
between instantaneous states and the enduring entities whose states they are.  
More often, however, Leibniz uses the term “derivative force” to 
connote the forces that are manifest in everyday experience and studied by 
working physicists. Thus, for example, in yet another letter to De Volder of 
June 20, 1703, Leibniz explains:  
Properly and rigorously speaking, perhaps one will not say that the 
primitive entelechy impels the mass of its body, but only that it is 
joined with a primitive passive power that it completes, i.e., with 
which it constitutes a monad. However, it cannot influence other 
entelechies and substances, even those existing in the same mass. 
But in the phenomena, i.e., in the resulting aggregate, everything is 
indeed explained mechanically, and masses are understood to impel 
one another. And in these phenomena nothing is needed except 
the consideration of derivative forces, once it is agreed where they 
result from, namely, the phenomena of aggregates from the reality 
of monads. (G 2:250/LDV 260) 
The term “derivative force” as used here still picks out forces that are 
dependent upon enduring primitive forces, and perhaps one could agree 
that in some non-strict sense they are the “same” as the instantaneous states 
of primitive forces (see Adams 1994, 385). Nonetheless, “derivative force” 
as used in the passage just quoted has a different meaning or connotation 
than it had in the previously quoted passage. As Leibniz usually uses the 
term, and as we will use it from here on out, “derivative force” draws a 
contrast between the forces that are, on the one hand, observable in 
everyday phenomena and studied by working physicists, and, on the other 
hand, the forces that Leibniz thinks are to be found at a deeper level of 
reality, and which are metaphysically presupposed by observable forces.  
Filling in the details of the relationship between Leibniz’s derivative 
forces (so understood) and primitive forces has been described as 
“probably the largest obstacle to understanding the relationship between 
Leibniz’s physics and Leibnizian metaphysics” (Adams 1994, 378). Leibniz’s 
analysis of rigid beams, however, suggests a rather elegant model for 
relating the two. For the observable forces governing extended beams 
should count, for Leibniz, as instances of derivative force. More specifically, 
the observable forces that govern a beam’s restoration after the removal of 
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a load should correspond to derivative active forces while the observable 
forces governing a beam’s deformation under the burden of a load should 
correspond to derivative passive forces. If Leibnizian derivative forces 
correspond to the observable forces of rigid beams, however, it seems 
reasonable to suppose that Leibnizian primitive forces should correspond 
to the unobservable point forces that Leibniz argues must be present in the 
limit as the length of the beam’s segments goes to zero. Those point forces 
should be counted as active or passive insofar as they are arrived at as the 
limits of active or passive derivative forces. This core suggestion might be 
fleshed out further by highlighting five specific features of the relationship 
between derivative and primitive forces suggested by Leibniz’s rigid beams 
model and by showing how those features are mirrored in a more familiar – 
indeed paradigmatic – example of mechanistic reduction, namely the 
reduction of observable heat to motions of particles.  
First, and perhaps most obviously, both the mechanists’ reduction 
of observable heat and Leibniz’s reduction of observable forces are 
asymmetric. The mechanists’ reduction of observable heat to particle motions 
is asymmetric insofar as mechanists hold that the motions of unobservable 
particles are ontologically and explanatorily deeper than observable heat 
itself. Heat, per se, is thus to be explained in terms of particle motions, but 
particle motions, per se, are not to be explained in terms of heat. On the 
rigid beams model, Leibniz’s reduction of observable forces to primitive 
forces is likewise asymmetric insofar as it suggests that primitive forces are 
ontologically and explanatorily deeper than derivative forces (see, for 
example, G 2:270/LDV 304-306). Derivative forces, per se, are to be 
explained in terms of primitive forces, but primitive forces, per se, are not to 
be explained in terms of derivative forces. Indeed, one especially intriguing 
aspect of Leibniz’s technical treatment of rigid beams, as we have seen, is 
that his very analysis gives him some grounds for supposing that 
explanations in terms of derivative “extended” forces must ultimately be 
grounded in primitive “point” forces. 
Second, both cases of reduction are non-eliminative. The mechanists’ 
reduction of heat to particle motions is non-eliminative insofar as 
mechanists typically do not mean to deny that heat exists or that it may 
legitimately figure in higher-level explanations. In maintaining that heat per 
se is to be explained in terms of particle motions, mechanists don’t typically 
mean to deny, for example, that the sun, my stove, and the campfire are all 
hot. Nor do they mean to deny that the sun’s heat warms the sandy beach, 
that the stove’s heat cooks my dinner, or that the heat of the campfire 
burns the marshmallow. Leibniz’s reduction of observable forces to 
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primitive forces is similarly non-eliminative insofar as he allows that the 
explanation of derivative forces in terms of primitive forces is consistent 
with maintaining that derivative forces exist and may legitimately figure in 
higher-level explanations. Like the mechanist, Leibniz can maintain that the 
reduction of derivative forces to primitive forces in no way implies the 
unreality of derivative forces governing, for example, hammers, nails and 
boards, and is perfectly consistent with insisting that those derivative forces 
may be appealed to in order to explain the behavior and interactions of 
extended bodies.  
Third, both cases of reduction might be said to be heterogeneous in 
light of the nature of the idealizations they take for granted. In suggesting 
that heat reduces to motions of particles, mechanists do not typically insist 
that putatively uniform regions of heat must reduce to uniform particle 
speeds.  Rather they insist only that uniform regions of heat must reduce to 
averaged particle speeds. Consequently, even if, for example, we assume that 
a room has a uniform temperature, the mechanists’ reduction of heat to 
particle motions is perfectly consistent with the supposition that no two 
particles in the room move with exactly the same speed. Leibniz’s reduction, 
should, I think, be understood as involving a similar idealization. In 
reducing derivative forces to primitive forces, Leibniz needn’t insist that 
putatively uniform regions of derivative force must reduce to uniform 
primitive forces. He can allow instead that uniform regions of derivative 
force must reduce merely to “averaged” primitive forces. Consequently, 
even if, for example, we assume that an extended beam has a uniform force 
for resisting deformation, Leibniz’s reduction is perfectly consistent with no 
two of its grounding primitive forces being exactly the same. A happy result, 
of course, if primitive forces are to be identified with the internal strivings 
of monads given the natural assumption that, for Leibniz, no two internal 
strivings of monads may be exactly the same.  
Fourth, although both cases of reduction are broadly quantitative, 
they are nonetheless non-mereological. It is, of course, central to the 
mechanists’ proposal that there is a quantitative relationship between heat 
and (averaged) particle speeds. Crudely: the greater the particle speeds the 
greater the heat. In spite of being quantitatively related, however, particle 
motions do not stand in a part-whole relation to observable heat. Particle 
motions aren’t literally parts of heat in the way that, say, bricks are literally 
parts of a brick house. It is similarly central to Leibniz’s reduction that there 
is at least a broadly quantitative relationship between derivative forces and 
primitive forces. Crudely: the greater, or more forceful, the primitive forces, 
the greater, or more forceful the derivative forces.  Nonetheless, primitive 
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forces just as clearly do not stand in a part-whole relation to derivative 
forces. Primitive forces are no more literally parts of derivative forces than 
are particle motions literally parts of heat. In spite of being broadly 
quantitative, the relationship between primitive forces and derivative forces 
is thus similarly non-mereological.   
Finally, fifth, in spite of being non-mereological, both cases are 
best understood as being local. The mechanists’ reduction of heat to particle 
motions is local in the sense that the observable heat of a given region is 
taken to reduce to particle motions located in the same general region, even 
though, as we’ve just seen, particle motions are not literally parts of the heat 
that they ground.  If a sandy beach is hot, the heat of the beach must be in 
the same general location as the motions of the particles that realize that 
heat, and this in spite of the fact that the motions of the particles are not 
parts of the heat in the same way as the grains of sand are parts of the 
beach itself. Leibniz’s reduction of derivative forces to primitive forces is 
similarly local in spite of being non-mereological. The derivative forces in a 
given region must reduce to primitive forces located in the same general 
region even though, as we’ve just seen, primitive forces are not literally 
parts of the derivative forces they ground. The derivative forces that make 
an extended beam resistant to deformation, and the primitive forces that 
ground those derivative forces, should thus be thought –on the rigid beams 
model – to be located at least roughly in the same place, even though 
primitive forces do not constitute derivative forces in the way that plastic 
pieces might constitute a toy car. As should become clearer in the next 
section, this implication of the rigid beams model has especially important 
consequences for understanding the relationship between extended 
Leibnizian bodies and unextended Leibnizian monads.  
The relationship between Leibniz’s derivative and primitive forces 
has long seemed obscure.  The aim of this section has been to show how 
Leibniz’s technical work on rigid beams may help to flesh out this crucial 
seam in his philosophical system. To briefly take stock: Leibniz’s approach 
to the technical problem of finding an equation governing the strengths of 
rigid beams suggests that the relationship between derivative and primitive 
forces may be characterized by five distinctive properties. That is to say, 
more specifically, the relationship between Leibnizian derivative and 
primitive forces may be characterized as being asymmetric, non-eliminative, 
heterogeneous, non-mereological and local. The next section will argue that 
such an understanding of the relationship between Leibnizian derivative 
and primitive forces may be used in turn to shed needed light on the 
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relationship between extended Leibnizian bodies and unextended 
Leibnizian monads.  
 
3. A Model for Leibnizian Bodies 
 
What, according to Leibniz, is the relationship between extended 
bodies and the substances that are supposed to serve as their foundations? 
For the past twenty-five years or so, answers to this question have largely 
been shaped by two paradigmatic interpretations of Leibniz’s metaphysics. 
On the one hand, idealist interpretations suggest that Leibniz’s metaphysical 
foundations are exhausted by unextended, immaterial substances, and that 
bodies are related to immaterial substances as their perceptions or thoughts 
(or contents thereof).9 One well-known difficulty for idealist interpretations 
is that Leibniz often suggests that bodies are “aggregates” of substances and 
that substances are “in” bodies, and it is difficult to make sense of how 
bodies could be aggregates of substances, and how substances could be in 
bodies, if bodies are nothing more than perceptions or thoughts (or 
contents thereof) had or enjoyed by substances. Corporeal substance 
interpretations, on the other hand, maintain that, for at least a significant 
stretch of his career, the foundations of Leibniz’s metaphysics are 
exhausted by extended, corporeal substances, and that bodies are related to 
corporeal substances roughly as constituents to aggregates.10 As long as the 
foundations of Leibniz’s metaphysics are taken to be exhausted by 
corporeal substances, corporeal substance interpretations can make good 
sense of how bodies may be aggregates of substances, and how substances 
may be in bodies. As noted in the introduction, however, almost all 
commentators concede that at some point the foundations of Leibniz’s 
metaphysics turns monadic. After that point – whenever it might be – 
corporeal substance interpretations offer no insight into how to make sense 
of the relationship between extended bodies and the unextended, 
immaterial substances of Leibniz’s most mature metaphysics. 
In light of the difficulties facing both idealist and corporeal 
substance interpretations, leading commentators have recently begun to 
revitalize a third, long-neglected interpretation of Leibniz’s mature 
metaphysics. What we might call non-mereological realist interpretations suggest 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 For sophisticated developments of this line of thought, see, for example, 
Adams (1994), Furth (1967), and Rutherford (1990, 1995).  
10 For sophisticated developments of this line of thought, see, for example, 
Broad (1975, 49-86), Garber (1985; 2009), and Phemister (1999; 2005).  
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that, for Leibniz, extended bodies are (at least partially) constituted by 
monads but that monads are nonetheless not parts of the extended bodies 
they constitute.11 Since they take substances to be immaterial and 
unextended, non-mereological realist interpretations can promise – like 
idealist interpretations – to make sense of even Leibniz’s most mature 
metaphysics. Since they suggest that bodies are constituted by substances, 
non-mereological realist interpretations can also promise – like corporeal 
substance interpretations – a straightforward account of how bodies may be 
aggregates of substances and how substances may be in bodies. So far so 
promising, but an obvious difficulty looms: it remains unclear how exactly 
Leibniz could think that monads might constitute extended bodies while 
also maintaining that monads are not literally parts of the bodies they 
constitute. It has been suggested that we might understand this relationship 
as being analogous to the relationship between the manifest image of 
ordinary experience and the scientific-image of contemporary science 
(Garber 2009, 383-384; Rutherford 2008, 149, 153-154). That is right, I 
think, as far as it goes, but in itself it doesn’t go all that far. Gestures 
towards the mysteries of how the world as we know it might be constituted 
by quarks, leptons and bosons, or even “strings” in a ten-dimensional space 
don’t give us much of a grip on how Leibniz himself could have thought 
that extended bodies could be aggregates of unextended monads. What 
we’d like is a concrete model – ideally one that Leibniz himself would have 
recognized –that makes it clearer how, exactly, extended bodies might be 
constituted by unextended monads without monads standing in a part-
whole relationship to the those bodies. 
Here again attention to Leibniz’s technical work on rigid beams 
proves extremely helpful. For in providing a sophisticated model of the 
relationship between derivative and primitive forces, Leibniz’s work on 
rigid beams also suggests a concrete model of the relationship between 
extended bodies and unextended monads. And, indeed, that it should do so 
should really come as no surprise. For Leibniz maintains that the properties 
of extended bodies must be grounded in their dynamic properties.12 He 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 For sophisticated developments of this line of thought, see, for example, 
Arthur and Loptson (2006, 21-33), Hartz (1992; 2007), Jolley (1986), and 
Rutherford (2008).  
12 The grounding relation has, of course, been the focus of much recent 
research.  For a route into the current debate, see Fine (2012), Rosen (2010), 
and Schaffer (2009). For discussion of grounding specifically in connection 
with Leibniz, see Della Rocca (2012) and McDonough (forthcoming-b). 
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insists that not only so-called secondary qualities like heaviness, heat and 
color but also primary qualities like “figure, motion and extension” must be 
rooted in derivative forces. But, as we’ve just seen, he also maintains that 
derivative forces must be grounded in primitive forces, that is, that the 
dynamic properties of observable bodies must be grounded in the dynamic 
properties of unobservable monads.  In providing a model of how 
derivative forces are grounded in primitive forces, Leibniz’s work on rigid 
beams might therefore be expected to also provide a model of how 
extended bodies are grounded in unextended monads. In order to develop 
that suggestion further, it may be helpful to revisit the five properties 
highlighted in the previous section, this time with an eye turned specifically 
to how those properties might flesh out Leibniz’s understanding of the 
relationship between extended bodies and unextended monads. 
First, and again most obviously, just as Leibniz’s grounding of 
derivative forces in primitive forces is asymmetric, so too his grounding of 
extended bodies in unextended monads is asymmetric. Indeed, this 
asymmetry may be seen as lying behind Leibniz’s famous declarations of 
monadic foundationalism. Thus, for example, near the beginning of The 
Principles of Nature and Grace, Leibniz emphasizes, “There must be simple 
substances everywhere, because without simples, there would be no 
composites” (G 6:598/AG 207). Likewise, the Monadology famously begins: 
“The Monad, which we shall discuss here, is nothing but a simple substance 
that enters into composites … And there must be simple substances, since 
there are composites; for the composite is nothing more than a collection, 
or aggregate, of simples. … These monads are the true atoms of nature, and, 
in brief, the elements of things” (G: 6:607/AG 213). Such passages clearly 
indicate that, at least in his later years, Leibniz took extended bodies to be 
asymmetrically grounded in unextended monads. To that central point, two 
sub-points might be added. (1) Although the rigid beams model implies an 
asymmetric dependence of extended bodies on unextended monads, it does 
not per se militate against the existence of extended, corporeal substances. 
The rigid beams model is perfectly consistent, for example, with a picture 
of Leibniz’s mature metaphysics according to which ordinary bodies are 
constituted by corporeal substances, which in turn are constituted by 
incorporeal substances (see, for example, McDonough 2013). (2) In 
suggesting that extended bodies are asymmetrically grounded in unextended 
monads, Leibniz’s rigid beams model does not preclude the possibility that 
there might be other explanatory relations running in the opposite direction. 
Indeed, one intriguing aspect of Leibniz’s technical treatment of rigid 
beams is that while it implies that the forces governing extended bodies 
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must be grounded in point forces, it also suggests that our only access to 
the values of those point forces is through the directly measurable forces 
governing extended bodies. 
Second, just as Leibniz’s grounding of derivative forces in primitive 
forces is non-eliminative, so too his grounding of extended bodies in 
unextended monads is non-eliminative. Although Leibniz does indeed seem to 
have flirted with an eliminative, Berkeleyian style idealism, his most 
considered position suggests that extended bodies are not to be done away 
with but rather that they are to be grounded, or well-founded, in substances 
and their perceptions or thoughts.13 Thus, for example, in the relatively 
early New System, Leibniz suggests that bodies would be “only phenomena 
like very orderly dreams” if – but only if – they were not grounded in true 
unities “analogous to the soul” (G 4:473-4/WF 23-24). Similarly in a letter 
to Johann Bernoulli of 1698, Leibniz suggests “there would be nothing in 
bodies but phantasms” if – but again only if – “there were no souls or 
something analogous to them,” concluding “From this, one can easily judge 
that there is no part of matter in which monads do not exist” (GM 
3:537/AG 167). And finally, in an often cited passage from a letter to De 
Volder of 1705, Leibniz declares quite explicitly “Indeed, I do not take away 
(tollo) body, but I reduce it (revoco) to that which it is, for I show that 
corporeal mass which is believed to have something over and above simple 
substances is not a substance but a phenomenon resulting from simple 
substances which alone have unity and absolute reality” (G 2:275/LDV 
318). Thus just as Leibniz’s mature dynamics suggests that derivative forces 
are not to be eliminated, but rather grounded in, primitive forces, so his 
mature metaphysics suggests that extended bodies are not to be eliminated, 
but rather grounded in, unextended monads.   
Third, just as Leibniz’s grounding of derivative forces in primitive 
forces is heterogeneous, so too is his grounding of extended bodies in 
unextended substances. Earlier it was noted that mechanists typically allow 
that putatively uniform regions of heat needn’t reduce homogeneously to 
particle motions, so that, say, the putatively uniform temperature of a frying 
pan might be grounded in the average, but non-uniform, motions of its 
constituting particles. It was argued above that Leibniz can similarly allow 
that putatively uniform derivative forces may be grounded in, as it were, 
“averaged,” but non-uniform, primitive forces. Shifting now to the 
relationship between extended bodies and monads, Leibniz can similarly 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 For discussion of Leibniz’s flirtations with eliminative idealism, see 
Adams (1994, 224-228); Garber (2009, 267-301); and Wilson (1999).   
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insist that putatively uniform extended bodies needn’t reduce 
homogeneously to monads. Indeed, in light of his more general 
philosophical commitments, it would seem that he must insist that 
putatively uniform extended bodies don’t reduce homogeneously to 
monads. For on pain of violating the identity of indiscernibles, he must 
insist that, say, a putatively uniform block of ice, wood or iron must be 
grounded in monads that are not exactly similar to one another. In this 
regard, the relationship between extended bodies and unextended monads 
would seem to have to be, for Leibniz, more closely analogous to the 
relationship between heat and the motions of its constituting particles than, 
say, the relationship between the motion of a train and the motion of its 
constituting cars. 
Fourth, just as Leibniz’s grounding of derivative forces in primitive 
forces is non-mereological, so too his grounding of extended bodies in 
unextended monads is non-mereological. Leibniz suggests that every extended 
body – no matter how small – is made up of an infinity of monads. There is 
thus a quantitative relationship between extended bodies and unextended 
monads just as there are broadly quantitative relationships between 
derivative and primitive forces as well as between heat and particle motions. 
As Leibniz repeatedly insists, however, the relationship between extended 
bodies and unextended monads is not whole-to-part. Thus, for example, in 
a passage that appears to be related to his notes on the Fardella memo, 
Leibniz writes: 
There are, however, infinite simple substances or creatures in any 
particle of matter; and matter is composed from these, not as from 
parts, but as from constitutive principles or [seu] immediate 
requisites, just as points enter into the essence of a continuum and 
yet not as parts, for nothing is a part unless it is homogeneous with 
a whole, but substance is not homogeneous with matter or body no 
more than a point is with a line. (A 6.4.1673) 
Similarly, in a letter to De Volder of June 30, 1704, Leibniz writes that the 
“substantial unities” that ultimately ground material bodies “are not parts” 
of bodies but rather the foundations of bodies (G 2:268/LDV 302). In 
denying that monads are parts of matter, Leibniz wishes to resist a certain 
picture of how unextended monads might be thought to be related to 
extended bodies: just as a line is not mereologically composed of points, so 
too an extended body is not mereologically composed of unextended 
monads. Nonetheless, in affirming that unextended monads compose 
extended bodies, Leibniz implies that unextended monads do stand in a 
relationship of composition to extended bodies. These two thoughts are 
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consistent because composition isn’t necessarily mereological. The 
schoolhouse may be mereologically composed of bricks, but the frying 
pan’s heat may be non-mereologically composed of the motions of particles. 
Thus just as Leibniz is able to maintain that derivative forces are grounded 
in primitive forces without allowing that primitive forces are parts of 
derivative forces, so too he is able to maintain that extended bodies are 
grounded in monads without allowing that monads are parts of the bodies 
they compose. 
Fifth, just as Leibniz suggests that primitive forces are located 
where their derivative forces are located, he also suggests that – in some 
sense – monads must be located where their bodies are located. Thus, for 
example, in a letter to De Volder of June 20, 1703, he writes:  
I had said that extension is the order of coexisting possible things, 
and that time is the order of inconsistent possibilities. If this is so, 
you say that you wonder how time pertains to all things, spiritual 
things as much as corporeal ones, but extension only to bodies. I 
reply that the reason is the same in both cases and for both sorts of 
things, namely that both spiritual and material changes have their 
home, so to speak, in the order of successive things, or in time, as 
well as their place in the order of coexisting things, or in space. [i] 
For even if monads are not extended, they nonetheless have a 
certain kind of situation in extension, that is, they have a certain 
ordered relation of coexistence to other things, namely through the 
machine over which they preside. [ii] I do not think that there exist 
any finite substances that are separated from every body and, 
therefore, lack situation or order in relation to the other coexisting 
things in the universe. Extended things involve in themselves many 
things endowed with situation. [iii] But things that are simple, even 
if they do not have extension, must nonetheless have a situation in 
extension, although it may not be possible to designate it precisely, 
as with incomplete phenomena. (LDV 266-268)  
Here Leibniz seems to be at pains to reject De Volder’s suggestion that 
monads enjoy temporal but not spatial locations. Leibniz argues, on the 
contrary, that [i] monads have spatial locations – wholly or in part – in 
virtue of dominating their bodies. That [ii] every monad dominates some 
body. And so, it would seem to follow that every actual monad must have 
some spatial location (even if, [iii] due to considerations of the continuum, 
that spatial location may be specifiable only as falling within a finite 
neighborhood rather than being at an exact point).  
“Leibniz	  and	  the	  Foundations	  of	  Physics:	  The	  Later	  Years,”	  to	  appear	  in	  The	  Philosophical	  Review,	  submitted	  2015.	  	   22	  
If it is allowed that monads are literally located within the bodies 
they dominate, Leibniz’s treatment of rigid beams might be viewed as 
offering a strikingly literal model of how monads relate to extended bodies; 
that is to say, if it is allowed that monads are literally located within bodies, 
we might take Leibnizian extended bodies to be literally constituted by 
monads in essentially the same way as we commonly take heat to be 
constituted by particle motions. Such an interpretation of Leibniz’s mature 
metaphysics might fairly claim the virtues commonly associated with non-
mereological realist interpretations. Even in the context of his most mature, 
monadic metaphysics, it could make good sense of Leibniz’s repeated 
claims that extended bodies are “aggregates” of substances and that 
substances are “in” bodies. Furthermore, it could do so without having to 
appeal apologetically to the mysteries of contemporary physics – to quarks 
or leptons or strings in ten dimensional space.  The need for a concrete 
model – always the Achilles heel of realist non-mereological realist readings 
– might finally be filled by a sober, sophisticated exemplar drawn from 
Leibniz’s own scientific studies. But can monads literally be located where 
their bodies are located? Can they, like bodies, exist not just in time but also 
in space? While this is not the place to try to settle the issue once and for all, 
the next section will attempt to at least reopen the question of the spatiality 
of monads. It argues that in spite of some important qualifications, there 
are good textual and contextual reasons for supposing that Leibniz might 
have held that monads enjoy spatial locations.  
 
4. Can Monads Be Spatial?   
 
The question of whether monads can be spatial is complicated by a 
number of well-known subtleties of Leibniz’s system.14 At root, those 
subtleties might be thought to flow from two commitments in particular. 
The first commitment is that monads are themselves unextended. As a 
consequence, they cannot enjoy locations in Aristotle’s sense, that is, they 
can’t enjoy locations defined in terms of enveloping surfaces. Nor can they 
enjoy locations in what we might think of as Newton’s sense, that is, in the 
sense of fully occupying finite regions or volumes. Nor finally – as we’ve 
seen – can monads enjoy locations in virtue of being literal parts of things 
that themselves enjoy locations. The second commitment concerns 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 For helpful discussions of Leibniz’s views on space see, for starters, 
Arthur (2013), Broad (1981), De Risi (2007), Hartz and Cover (1988), and 
Winterborne (1982).  
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Leibniz’s understanding of space. Since Leibnizian space is relational, 
monads can’t be spatial in virtue of being located within an ontologically 
independent, substantival space. Furthermore, since Leibnizian space is 
continuous, and monadic reality discrete, monads can’t be located at 
specific spatial points; the continuous and the discrete are, for Leibniz, in 
general, incommensurable.15 Finally, since Leibniz maintains that, strictly 
speaking, space itself is ideal entity, monads can’t, strictly speaking, be in 
space any more than they can be in an ideal square or an ideal circle (see, for 
example, LDV 130, G IV 568, G IV 491-92).  
Such subtleties, however, would seem to leave open the possibility 
that Leibniz takes monads to be located where their bodies are located. 
That is, that he would agree, for example, that when he was living in Paris 
that not only was his body located in the French capital, but that his soul, 
his body’s dominant monad, was there too. Indeed, the subtleties of the 
previous paragraph would seem to be consistent with monads being 
spatially located in a more specific sense. The location of a monad might be 
specifiable by the volume of a surrounding body taken as small as one likes. 
So, for example, Leibniz could hold that if a monad is located in a beam, it 
must be located in one half or other of the beam; and whatever half it is 
located in, it must be located in one half or other of that half, and so on as 
far as one wishes to go (cf. G II 100/AG 88; NE 221). Such a picture offers 
one sense in which monads might enjoy spatial locations without apparently 
violating either of Leibniz’s two main complicating commitments. It does 
not require monads themselves to be extended. As a consequence, it does 
not require monads to either have surfaces that might be enveloped or to 
fully occupy finite regions or volumes. Nor does it require monads to be 
located in a substantival, absolute space. It is therefore prima facie consistent 
with Leibniz’s relationalism about space as well as his reluctance to locate 
monads at spatial points. With this more specific picture in mind, let’s call 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 In what follows, I assume that Leibniz distinguishes between ideal, 
continuous extension, on the one hand, and non-ideal, infinitely-divided 
extension on the other hand (see, for example, LDB 124, LDV 333; G 
4:394-5/AG 251-2; G 7:563). If monads are to be located within extended 
bodies, they will have to be located within extension that is not 
characterized by continuity. For attempts to contextualize, develop, and 
make precise the distinction between ideal, continuous extension and non-
ideal, non-continuous extension, see Arthur (2014, 149-153), (Levey 2005, 
2003, 1998), Marshall (2011). For important alternative views see Crockett 
(2009, 1999), Hartz (1992), Hartz and Cover (1988, especially 507). 
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the view that, in his mature period, Leibniz standardly took monads to be 
located within bodies the spatiality thesis. 
The spatiality thesis, or something near enough, was once 
commonly attributed to Leibniz by leading scholars, including, for example, 
Bertrand Russell (1937, 118-126), Nicholas Rescher (1986, 84-91) and A.T. 
Winterborne (1982, 201-214). It has, however, clearly fallen out of favor 
among more recent commentators. Thus, for example, Robert Adams, 
although he defends a characteristically interesting and subtle view 
concerning the relationship between monads and bodies, ultimately insists 
that “monads per se do not have any location” and that “In themselves the 
monads have no spatial position and no other spatial properties” (1994, 250, 
255). Donald Rutherford similarly maintains that “monads, are non-spatial 
entities,” and attributes to Leibniz the alleged insight that “in conceiving of 
a truly simple thing that is, nonetheless, real, a thing whose determinations 
are entirely internal, one is limited to thinking of a substance that is not in 
space and that cannot be used to explain the spatiality of appearances” 
(2004, 233; see also 1994, 66; 1995, 191, 251). Finally, Daniel Garber, 
although he expresses uncertainty as to whether Leibniz had a fully 
considered view concerning the spatiality of monads, concedes, “it is 
difficult to say exactly how monads can have situation” (2009, 360). The 
relationship between monads and space is too complex and thorny to be 
taken up here in full detail. Nonetheless, since the current consensus against 
the spatiality thesis represents an obvious objection to the interpretation of 
the foundations of Leibniz’s physics developed above, it should be 
worthwhile to briefly consider three reasons for thinking that the current 
consensus might be mistaken, and that the previous generation of 
commentators was right to think that Leibniz takes monads to enjoy at least 
approximate spatial locations.  
A first reason for thinking that Leibniz accepts the spatiality thesis 
as just described is provided by the numerous passages in which Leibniz 
explicitly tells us that monads are located in matter or in the bodies they 
dominate. The passage cited above from Leibniz’s letter to De Volder of 
June 20, 1703, in which he states, “even if monads are not extended, they 
nonetheless have a certain kind of situation in extension,” is perhaps the 
most famous (LDV 266). Also well known is a passage from Leibniz’s 
correspondence with Arnauld in which he suggests that if an insect is 
divided in half “the soul of the insect will remain only on one side” and that 
“since, in the formation and growth of the insect, the soul was, from the 
beginning, in a certain part that was already living, after the destruction of 
the insect it will still remain in a certain part … as small as is necessary for it 
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to be protected from the action of someone tearing or destroying the body 
of that insect” (G II 100/AG 88). Other passages to similar effect, however, 
are not hard to find. Thus, for example, in a letter to Johann Bernoulli 
dated approximately August-September 1698, Leibniz writes: “But if there 
were no souls or something analogous to them, then there would be no I 
[Ego], no monads, no real unities, and therefore there would be no 
substantial multitudes; indeed, there would be nothing in bodies but 
phantasms. From this, one can easily judge that there is no part of matter in 
which monads do not exist” (LDV 8). Likewise in another letter to De 
Volder dated January 19, 1706, Leibniz writes: “It is also obvious from what 
I have said that, in actual things, there is only discrete quantity, namely a 
multitude of monads or simple substances, indeed a multitude greater than 
any number you choose in every sensible aggregate, that is, in every 
aggregate corresponding to phenomena” (LDV 332). Finally in a letter to 
Des Bosses of February 14, 1706, Leibniz writes: “Since monads or 
principles of substantial unity are everywhere in matter, it follows from this 
that there is also an actual infinity, for there is no part, or part of a part, that 
does not contain monads” (LDB 24, see also G 7:565). Passages such as 
these imply that monads enjoy spatial locations, that monads are “in bodies,” 
“in actual things,” “in matter” and so must be located where bodies, things, 
and matter are located. Paired with the interpretation of the foundations of 
Leibniz’s physics developed above, such passages suggest that, indeed, since 
the Pont Neuf is in Paris, the monads that make up, constitute, or ground the 
Pont Neuf must be located in Paris as well.  
A second, contextual reason for thinking that Leibniz accepts the 
spatiality thesis is provided by the views of his predecessors. As Robert 
Pasnau has recently argued in detail, Leibniz’s predecessors seem to have 
uniformly insisted that all creatures must be located somewhere.16 The view 
that all creatures must enjoy spatial locations is found already in the ancient 
Greeks. Plato, for example, writes that space “provides a home for all 
created things, and … [we] say of all existence that it must of necessity be in 
some place and occupy a space, but that what is neither in heaven nor in 
earth has no existence” ([Timaeus 52b] 1989, 1178-1179). Aristotle similarly 
insists that “The physicist must have a knowledge of place” … since “all 
suppose that things which exist are somewhere” while only the “non-
existent is nowhere” ([Physics IV.1, 208a27-30] 1984, 354). The notion that 
all creatures must be spatially located continued to be upheld throughout 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 For discussion of the relevant historical background (to which I’m 
indebted here) see Pasnau (2011, 328-333).  
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the middle ages. Augustine, for example, allows that nothing so demands 
his assent as the view that “Whatever exists must exist somewhere” 
([Soliloquia I.15.29] 1948, 379). Peter John Olivi, taking up the question of 
whether angels in particular enjoy locations, concludes that it is impossible 
for any creature “to have an existence that is absolutely free of every local 
relation” ([II.32] 1922, 587). And William Ockham, in discussing God’s 
relation to his creatures, simply takes it for granted that “there is no thing 
that really exists that is nowhere, distant from all things” ([Ordinatio I.37] 
1967-1989, 4:568-9). The view that all creatures must enjoy spatial locations 
persists in the thinking of Leibniz’s still more immediate, early modern 
predecessors. Francisco Suárez, for example, insists, “no thing (res) can be 
understood that does not exhibit its real presence somewhere ([40.4.19] 
1965, 548). Henry More, maintains that, provided that place is not taken as 
the “Concave superficies of one body immediately environing another 
body,” we can assert that “spirits are as truly in place as bodies” ([Book I, 
Chapter 10] 1659, 72). Newton concurs, writing, “No being exists or can 
exist which is not related to space in some way. … created minds are 
somewhere, and body is in the space that it occupies; and whatever is 
neither everywhere nor anywhere does not exist” ([De Gravitatione 4] 2004, 
25). The seemingly universal conviction among Leibniz’s predecessors and 
contemporaries that all creatures enjoy spatial locations provides, a 
powerful prima facie reason for thinking that Leibniz accepted the spatiality 
thesis as well, that is, for thinking that when he says that monads are located 
“in bodies,” “in actual things,” “in matter,” we may take him at his word. 
A third, also contextual reason, for thinking that Leibniz accepted 
the spatiality thesis is provided by the views of his immediate successors in 
the German “Leibnizian” tradition. For the most important figures of that 
tradition, including Christian Wolff, Alexander Baumgarten, and the early 
Kant all maintained that the most foundational elements of the created 
world enjoy spatial locations. Thus, for example, in his Cosmologia Generalis, 
Wolff suggests that while the most foundational elements of things are 
unextended, they may nonetheless be “external to each other” so that when 
they co-exist together in one thing, the resulting aggregate must be 
extended ([§§ 219-221] 1964, 168-170). In his Metaphysics, Baumgarten, 
states even more explicitly, “single monads have a position (§148), which is 
either place in simultaneous monads or age in successive monads, or both 
(§281)” ([§397] 2013, 174).  And in his Physical Monadology, the early Kant 
insists, “Each simple element of a body, that is to say, each monad, is not 
only in space; it also fills a space, though it does not, for that reason, forfeit 
its simplicity” ([1:480] 1992, 56). The contextual evidence here is, of course, 
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indirect. One could see a fundamental parting of the ways between Leibniz 
and the German Leibnizian tradition.17 The reception of Leibniz’s 
metaphysics by his most immediate successors, however, is, I think, more 
plausibly taken as further evidence that Leibniz’s explicit claims that 
monads are located “in bodies,” “in actual things,” “in matter” may be 
taken at face value. Doing otherwise would require us to see Leibniz not 
only as departing radically from his predecessors, but also from his most 
immediate successors.   
Given the strong textual and contextual evidence in favor of the 
spatiality thesis, why would anyone think that Leibniz does not hold that 
monads are spatially located? It should be conceded that the issue of the 
spatiality of monads intersects with a number of difficult – and uncertain – 
themes in Leibniz’s philosophy, and plausible disagreement in other areas 
might lead to plausible disagreement concerning the spatiality of monads as 
well. One influential reason for rejecting the spatiality thesis, however, 
seems to rest on a misunderstanding. It’s widely assumed that earlier 
thinkers held that immaterial entities in general do not, and cannot, enjoy 
spatial locations. Such an assumption figures, for example, explicitly and 
centrally in Jan Cover and Glenn Hartz’s highly influential attack on the 
spatiality thesis in their important article “Can Monads be Spatial?” Near 
the beginning of their essay, Cover and Hartz write: “At first glance 
Leibniz’s monads hardly seem the right sort of thing to be spatially located.  
In the dualist tradition, immaterial substances are reckoned completely 
bereft of properties like spatial location: spatiality is a feature only of 
physical objects, and monads are as mental as things get” (1994, 295). In 
their concluding remarks, Cover and Hartz return to this “argument from 
dualism” suggesting that such considerations of “the tradition can scarcely 
be underplayed,” and concluding that with reflection on the dualist tradition 
and Leibniz’s commitment to it “the spatiality thesis emerges with little to 
recommend it” (1994, 311). Given his commitment to a fundamental 
ontology exhausted by mind-like entities, one might be tempted to quibble 
over Cover and Hartz’s description of Leibniz as a “dualist” (as opposed to, 
say, a non-eliminative mentalist). In spite of the name they give it, however, 
Cover and Hartz’s “argument from dualism,” doesn’t really turn on 
Leibniz’s being a dualist at all. The real thrust of their argument is simply 
that (i) philosophers of the past consistently held that immaterial things 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 In a rich and provocative paper, Donald Rutherford defends just such an 
interpretation, arguing that while Wolff’s elements are indeed spatial, 
Leibniz’s monads are not (2004). See also Kant (1910-, 7:248).  
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must lack spatial properties, (ii) Leibniz clearly maintains that monads are 
immaterial, and so, absent strong evidence to the contrary, we should 
conclude (iii) Leibniz similarly maintains that monads lack spatial properties. 
Although not always announced so explicitly, I suspect that a similar line of 
thought lies behind much of the current consensus against the spatiality 
thesis. 
Widely accepted or not, however, no one should be moved by this 
allegedly “dualist” line of thought. For the crucial premise that thinkers of 
the past generally held that immaterial entities must lack spatial properties 
just isn’t true. Some evidence that it is false is provided by the passages 
cited above. Whether counted as dualists or not, most of Leibniz’s 
predecessors believed in the existence of created immaterial beings – 
including souls, intellects, and angels. They nonetheless all insisted that 
created beings must exist somewhere. Further evidence that Leibniz’s 
predecessors accepted the spatiality of immaterial beings is provided by the 
doctrine of holenmerism. Holenmerism is the view that some things may exist 
not partes extra partes – not parts outside of parts – but rather holenmerically 
(or in more scholastic parlance, “definitively”), that is wholly in different 
parts. Many of Leibniz’s predecessors, including Plotinus, Augustine, 
Anselm, Bonaventure, Aquinas, Scotus, Ockham, Buridan, and arguably 
even Descartes, held that human immaterial souls exist holenmerically in 
their respective human bodies (Pasnau 2011, 337). But if bodies enjoy 
spatial locations, and souls exist where their bodies exist, then souls must 
enjoy (at least approximate) spatial locations as well. Still further evidence 
that Leibniz’s predecessors were willing to ascribe spatial properties to 
immaterial entities is provided by the commonly held view – perhaps 
especially surprising today – that spatial locations can even be ascribed to 
God. Thus, for example, Anselm argues that God can neither exist 
“nowhere and never,” nor “somewhere and sometime,” and so must exist 
“everywhere and always” ([Monologium, chapter 20] 1998, 33-34). Scotus 
similarly insists that it cannot be “said that God is nowhere, since that 
seems to be a characteristic of nothing,” adding that “one must say that 
God is everywhere through his essence” ([Reportatio A I.37.1-2 n.27] 2008, 
444). Similarly, Suárez maintains that “God is intimately present to this 
corporeal universe, not only by presence (that is, cognitively) and by power 
or action, but also by his essence or substance, just as all theologians teach, 
as certain to the faith, on account of divine immensity” ([50.3.8] 1965, 984). 
The evidence thus suggests that it is just not true that philosophers once 
generally held that “spatiality is a feature only of physical objects.” Indeed, 
exactly the opposite conclusion seems in order: philosophers of the past 
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commonly held that immaterial things must enjoy spatial locations. It is, of 
course, still possible that Leibniz meant to break with this tradition as well. 
Nonetheless the case against the spatiality thesis seems far less compelling 
than is widely assumed. If our best understanding of Leibniz’s work in 
physics proves inconsistent with the non-spatiality of monads, we should 
certainly be prepared, I think, to reconsider his commitment to the latter in 
developing the former.  
  
5. Conclusion 
 
The primary aim of the present essay has been to show how attention to 
Leibniz’s neglected work on rigid beams may help to shed light on his 
understanding of the relationship between his sophisticated physics and his 
foundational metaphysics. The first section accordingly revisited Leibniz’s 
approach to the technical problem of determining the breaking strengths of 
loaded beams fixed at one end. That work, it was argued, suggests a 
sophisticated, but not unintuitive model of the relationship between 
observable forces governing extended bodies and unobservable “point” 
forces.  The second section argued that Leibniz’s rigid beams model further 
offers a way of understanding the relationship between his derivative and 
primitive forces. Very roughly, Leibniz’s derivative forces may be grounded 
in primitive forces in much the same way as the observable forces 
governing extended beams may be grounded in unobservable point forces. 
The third section argued that such an understanding of the relationship 
between Leibniz’s derivative and primitive forces in turn provides insight 
into Leibniz’s understanding of the relationship between extended bodies 
and unextended monads. Very roughly, since Leibniz takes the properties of 
extended bodies to be grounded in their dynamic properties, and the 
properties of monads to be grounded in their dynamic properties, in 
providing a model of how derivative forces are grounded in primitive forces, 
Leibniz’s work on rigid beams also provides an account of how extended 
bodies may be grounded in unextended monads. Finally, the fourth section 
took up a likely objection to the account offered in the previous sections. It 
argued – contrary to current consensus – that monads may in fact be 
spatially located in the sense that they may be located at least approximately 
where their extended bodies are located. 
A secondary, more general aim of the present essay has been to 
draw – or redraw – attention to what might be thought of as the neglected 
theme of Daniel Garber’s seminal Leibniz and the Foundations of Physics: The 
Middle Years. In that paper, Garber effectively linked two themes for a 
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generation of Leibniz scholars. The first theme concerned the relationship 
between Leibniz’s physics and his foundational metaphysics. To what 
extent are there rich, interesting relations between Leibniz’s considerable 
scientific accomplishments and his seemingly fantastic metaphysical 
speculations? The second theme concerned the status of corporeal 
substances in Leibniz’s philosophy. Did Leibniz think that the world is 
constituted by extended, corporeal substances, and if so, for how long? 
Garber conjectured that the two themes are related, that in his middle years 
Leibniz’s metaphysics of corporeal substances provides his physics with an 
intelligible, realist foundation for his physics and that it is only later, after he 
“put aside his serious work in physics,” and after his science loses “its grip 
on reality” that Leibniz introduces incorporeal substances (1985, 99). Over 
the past thirty years or so, a tremendous amount of work has been devoted 
to exploring Garber’s second theme and much progress has been made in 
understanding the evolution and complexity of Leibniz’s views on 
substance. Garber’s first, and I think even more interesting theme, however, 
has received far less attention. Armed now with a better appreciation of the 
foundations of Leibniz’s metaphysics, the time is ripe to reconsider its 
relations to his sophisticated scientific studies. If his work on rigid beams is 
any indication, Leibniz’s thinking about the foundations of his physics may 
well prove to be every bit as interesting, subtle and challenging as his 
thinking about the foundations of his metaphysics.  
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(New Haven: Yale University Press, 2013). Reference is to original language 
page.  
 
NE = P. Remnant and J. Bennett, ed. and trans., New Essays on Human 
Understanding (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press 1996) reference is to 
book, chapter, section. 
 
WF = R. Woolhouse and R. Franks, ed. and trans., Leibniz’s “New System” 
and Associated Texts (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2006).  
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